

HISTORICAL NOTES

How to Handle Crises?

The ability to be cool, confident, and decisive in crisis is not an inherited characteristic but is the direct result of how well the individual has prepared himself for the battle.

Going through the necessary soul-searching of deciding whether to fight a battle, or to run away from it, is far more difficult than the battle itself.

The classic crisis is one involving physical danger. What is essential in such situations is not so much "bravery" in the face of danger as the ability to think "selflessly."



NIXON & IKE IN WEST VIRGINIA (1952)
All but No. 6.

These are some of the lessons that Richard M. Nixon has drawn from his crisis-ridden career—and which he passes along to readers of his *Six Crises*, published in part by LIFE and now out in a book (Doubleday; 460 pp.; \$5.95). It is a curious document. It displays at times a genuine humility—and at times a needless, naive immodesty. It provides some absorbing footnotes to recent history. It gives insight into the strange political relationship between Nixon and Eisenhower. And it tells more about Nixon than he may have intended.

The crises of Nixon's life were 1) the Hiss case, which "left a residue of hatred and hostility toward me"; 2) the Nixon fund, which almost got him tossed off the Republican national ticket in 1952; 3) the Eisenhower heart attack of 1955, when Nixon faced the delicate task of assuming responsibility without appearing to usurp power; 4) the riotous Nixon visit to South America in 1958, which almost ended in his death at the hands of a Caracas mob; 5) the "kitchen debate" with Khrushchev during Nixon's 1959 mission to Moscow, and 6) the 1960 campaign itself.

Ike & Dick. President Eisenhower assigned to Nixon more responsibility than had been given any previous Vice President. Yet Ike's real feelings about Nixon were often baffling—most of all to Nixon. During the fund crisis, Eisenhower telephoned Nixon only once, three days after the furor broke in the press. "I have come to the conclusion," said Candidate Eisenhower to his running mate, "that you are the one who has to decide what to do . . . If the impression got around that you got off the ticket because I forced you to get off, it is going to be very bad. On the other hand, if I issue a statement now backing you up, in effect people will accuse me of condoning wrongdoing."

At the height of the fund crisis, Nixon wrote out a letter of withdrawal from the

ticket, and in the best sense of those words. Not shackled to a one-track mind, he always applied two, three, or four lines of reasoning to a single problem and he usually preferred the indirect approach where it would serve him better than the direct attack on a problem. His mind was quick and facile. His thoughts far outraced his speech and this gave rise to his frequent "scrambled syntax."

Just Plain Dick. Most of his opponents paint Nixon as a ruthless, calculating politician without an ounce of humanity in his soul. Yet there are numberless incidents in the book that show him as a lonely man who treasures tiny tributes as though they were sapphires. He recalls that in the midst of the Lima riots, just before Caracas, "Tad Szulc, Latin American correspondent for the New York Times, ran alongside the car saying, 'Good going, Mr. Vice President, good going.'" In Moscow, immediately after his harangue with Khrushchev, "Ernie Barcella, the correspondent for United Press International, came alongside and whispered in my ear. 'Good going, Mr. Vice President.'" After a speech in New York: "The audience gave me a standing ovation. As I sat down, Governor Dewey grasped my hand and said: 'That was a terrific speech.'"

Nixon survived five of his six crises—and each, in one way or another, led to the sixth. Some may wonder why he calls his campaign for the presidency a crisis—except, of course, that he lost. Despite some cries of foul play against Kennedy,* Nixon attributes defeat to three major factors: 1) "The campaign was too long, from all standpoints," 2) "A candidate must save himself for the major events—and his staff must never forget this," and 3) "I spent too much time on substance, and too little time on appearance."

These may indeed have been contributing reasons for Nixon's defeat. But the basic cause was that, in conducting an incredibly bad campaign, he was so concerned about how he would appear under pressure and about creating the image of a "new Nixon" that he forgot about the tough, aggressive abilities that had enabled him to forge ahead through previous crises. It is interesting to speculate whether, by just remaining the "old Nixon," he would be President of the U.S. today.

ticket—which his campaign manager, Murray Chotiner, tore up. Even when the telegrams of support for Nixon were flooding in after the "Checkers" speech, there was still no message from Eisenhower—owing to garbled communications, as it turned out. Nixon moodily concluded that Ike was still undecided about keeping him on the ticket. At that point, he admits, Nixon got sore at Ike.

Again, before the abortive "Dump Nixon" movement in 1956, Ike appeared to agree that Nixon should not stand for reelection as Vice President. Writes Nixon: "It was 'most disappointing' to him, he said, to see that my popularity had not risen as high as he had hoped it would. For that reason, he said, it might be better for me in a new Administration not to be Vice President but to be a Cabinet officer." Yet, when Nixon finally said he wanted to be Vice President again, Eisenhower seemed to welcome the decision.

For all his frustrations at Ike's hands, Nixon remains genuinely admiring of his old chief. His summation of President Eisenhower: "He was a far more complex and devious man than most people real-

* The loudest cry got the biggest headlines last week. In the book, Nixon accuses Kennedy of "jeopardizing the security of a United States foreign policy operation" in mid-campaign. Kennedy, he says, had been briefed on the CIA's program of secretly arming and training anti-Castro exiles for an invasion of Cuba, and thereafter deliberately advocated a similar program—"in effect, direct intervention," writes Nixon—in a campaign statement. This, says Nixon, compelled him to denounce the Kennedy program as "dangerously irresponsible," even though he had known about the invasion plan and supported it. He says he did this to preserve the CIA secret—and that the statement cost him votes. "The covert operation," he writes, "had to be protected at all costs." The Nixon charge brought an instant denial from the White House. Then the whole incident turned into a historical phantasmagoria when former CIA Director Allen Dulles agreed that Kennedy had not been told of the Cuban invasion plans until after his election.



EMINGER & ETHEL

SENATOR & MRS. MANSFIELD WITH SENATOR BYRD
A rueful chuckle about a special kind of lie.

JUSTICES BLACK & BRENNAN & WIVES

sile soar out over the Pacific, learned later that it had sped 5,000 miles downrange, landing within a mile of its target. It was the first time that he had seen an ICBM fired. Then, in the relaxing atmosphere of California's Palm Springs area, where he was a weekend guest at Bing Crosby's estate, Kennedy paid a 50-minute call on another sun seeker, former President Dwight Eisenhower. They chatted mainly about world affairs.

The mere notion of Kennedy's visiting California seemed to send former Vice President Richard Nixon, deeply involved in a hard campaign to unseat Democrat Pat Brown as California's Governor, into a terrible tizzy. Noting that Robert Kennedy was also speaking in the state, Nixon said: "We welcome them. In November we are going to show these carpetbaggers a thing or two." Asked about this, Presidential Press Secretary Pierre Salinger replied: "I don't know anybody in the United States, no matter in what state he resides, who considers the President of the United States a carpetbagger."

Family Jokes

His wild Irish prose, it sparkles and it glows.

It fulfills all the needs—of word, if not deeds.

And if Cuba we lose, we can heal up the bruise

With the charm of his fine Irish smile.

As this and other satiric bits ricocheted through a Statler Hilton dining room, John Kennedy's smile seemed wan. Like any President, Kennedy is sensitive to kidding, and at their annual Gridiron Club dinner, Washington newsmen ribbed him, his policies and his family mercilessly. But when the President arose for his own five-minute speech, he showed that he could dish it out as well as take it.*

* The President's Gridiron Club speech is supposed to be off the record. But Washington's newswomen, who are excluded, do not consider themselves bound by the rule. Last week the Washington Post's Dorothy McCordle buttonholed the diners, found out what the President had said, and quoted him in the paper, thereby putting his speech on the public record.

Denying that he would intervene energetically in the Massachusetts Democratic senatorial primary, in which his brother Ted is running against House Speaker John McCormack's nephew Ed, the President quipped: "We're not sending in any troops, just a few training missions. We're confining ourselves to the slogan, 'We'd rather be Ted than Ed.'" Referring to his sister-in-law, he said it was not true that "we're going to change the name of Lafayette Square to Radziwill Square—at least, not during my first term." About Jackie's trip he observed: "I know my Republican friends were glad to see my wife feeding an elephant in India. She gave him sugar and nuts. But of course the elephant wasn't satisfied."

Warming to the evening's mood, the President's wit ranged widely. Recalling his efforts to persuade the U.S. to drink milk as an aid to the dairy industry, he said: "I am certainly enjoying being with you newsmen this evening. None of you know how tough it is to have to drink milk three times a day." He used the occasion to return the press-conference barbs thrown frequently at him, as at President Eisenhower, by Newswoman Sarah McClendon. "I saw my wife's picture watching a snake charmer in India," Kennedy said. "As soon as I learn Sarah McClendon's favorite tune, I'm going to play it." He dealt deftly with another frequent press critic, New York Times Columnist Arthur Krock, and with Washington's Metropolitan Club, which does not admit Negroes. "Krock criticized me for not letting President Tshombe of Katanga come here," the President noted. "So I told him we would work out a deal. I'll give Tshombe a visa and Arthur can give him a dinner at the Metropolitan Club."

THE CAPITAL Advice & Dissent

The lobby of Washington's Trans-Lux Theater was lined with two rows of Senate pages handing out bright orange programs. The house was full; on hand were 76 Senators (enough to override a presi-

dential veto), Supreme Court Justices Hugo Black and William Brennan, Postmaster General J. Edward Day, USIA Chief Edward R. Murrow, Marine Commandant David M. Shoup, and some 400 lesser lights—all gathered for a private movie showing of *Advice and Consent*, based on Allen Drury's novel about the U.S. Senate.

"Never mind how many Senators," said Producer-Director Otto Preminger, waiting happily under the marquee. "I'm only interested in the Robert Kennedys." Finally, Ethel Kennedy arrived; Bobby had begged off—he had just finished a long day of testifying on Capitol Hill. "Come in and be a star," said Otto to Ethel. In they went, and the screening got under way.

To many in the audience, the film seemed a bit like a 2½-hour filibuster in black and white. But there were some highlights, notable among them the performance of Charles Laughton as South Carolina's Senator Seab Cooley—in accents learned from careful study of the drawl of Mississippi's Senator John Stennis. The audience chuckled ruefully when Henry Fonda defined "a Washington, D.C., kind of lie: that's where I'm lying but he knows that I'm lying and he knows that I know that he knows that I'm lying." Gene Tierney drew laughs with a shaft aimed at Washington hostesses: "They say any bitch with a million bucks can be the best."

After it was over, some Senators offered advice and dissent. Suorted North Carolina's B. Everett Jordan: "I didn't recognize a thing in it." "We're much more complicated than that," said Minnesota's Eugene McCarthy. Growled South Carolina's Strom Thurmond, who objected to the movie's scenes dealing with one Senator's homosexuality (and consequent blackmail): "I don't think it will be wholesome for either our people or those abroad." Ed Murrow, a man not often at a loss for words, did not even care to think about what the film would do to the U.S. image overseas. "Aw," he groaned, "I don't want to get near that one, not tonight."